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THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: RATIFICATION
OR NATIONALIZATION?
The Treaty of 1903 between the United States and Panama'
governs the administration of the Panama Canal, and no longer
reflects the balance of political power and interests, either foreign
or domestic, of the two countries. As a result of the implementation
of the Treaty of 1903, the governments of the United States and the
Republic of Panama have endured an uneasy relationship for over
seventy years. This relationship has been marked primarily by an
apparent lack of agreement concerning their respective rights and
obligations.2
For fifteen years the United States and Panama have been
conducting negotiations with the objective of creating a new regime
for the Panama Canal. Early in 1977, President Carter pledged that
a new treaty, acceptable to the international community, Panama,
and the United States, would be reached. Treaty negotiations were
completed in August, 1977, and the treaty was signed by the two
heads of state in early September of the same year.
The Canal treaty negotiations, however, struck a divisive
chord both in the United States and in Panama. After years of dis-
interest by the United States public, the prospect of losing the Ca-
nal has taken on a life and death significance. Many Americans
perceived the treaty negotiations as an indication of failing United
States strength in the world. Some Panamanians, mostly ultra-
leftists, view the American presence as an intrusion upon their sov-
ereignty, and charge that the treaties are an outrageous sellout of
Panamanian interests. This attitude strikes many Americans as a
most unfortunate lack of gratitude for all that Panama has received
from the United States; for the United States gave Panama not only
its Canal, but also its existence.
3
1. Convention with the Republic of Panama for the Construction of a Ship Canal to
Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, 38 Stat. 2234 (1903-
'05), T.S. No. 431 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of 19031.
2. See generally N. PADELFORD, THE PANAMA CANAL IN PEACE AND WAR 45-79
(1943).
3. The role of the United States in supporting the Panamanian revolution has been
319
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The population of Panama is economically dependent upon
the operation of an inter-oceanic canal; yet, the natural resource
inherent in Panama's geographical position is controlled by the
United States under the Treaty of 1903. Panamanian objections to
the exercise of authority by the United States have been a common
topic for negotiation. While both nations have expressed a willing-
ness to compromise on many of the issues, each nation has started
from a different assumption. The United States has started from the
premise that it enjoys full powers in the Canal Zone. On the other
hand, Panama has started from the position that the United States
had been accorded only limited rights in the Canal Zone, and has,
in fact, been exceeding its powers under the Treaty of 1903.
The force of nationalism in Panama has been underestimated
by the United States since 1903. As nationalistic pressures in Pan-
ama intensify due to Panamanian displeasure with the Treaty of
1903 and continued American presence, failure of the Senate to
give its advice and consent to the newly negotiated treaty may force
Panamanian authorities to consider a logical alternative; that is,
unilateral termination of the Treaty of 1903 and nationalization of
the Panama Canal.
This comment will examine three questions relevant to unilat-
eral termination and nationalization: 1) what are the legal justifica-
tions for unilateral termination of the Treaty of 1903 and
nationalization of the Panama Canal; 2) how does Panama's stance
compare with Egypt's position when the nationalization of the Suez
Canal occurred; and 3) what are the legal proscriptions against uni-
lateral intervention by the United States? As a basis for these dis-
cussions, this comment will also provide some background
regarding the history of the treaty negotiations and the positions
espoused by both parties prior to President Carter and General
Torrijos' signing of the new, though unratified, Canal treaty.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Treaty of 1903 made no provision for either its termina-
tion or revision. The circumstances surrounding the Treaty's draft-
ing, coupled with the use of the words granting sovereignty "in
criticized severely. President Theodore Roosevelt sent three battleships to Panama with or-
ders to maintain free and uninterrupted transit of the Panama railroad and to prevent the
landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent. Thus, Colom-
bia was successfully prevented from attempting to suppress the Panamanian revolution. See
generally Hoyt, Law and Politics in the Revision of Treaties Affecting the Panama Canal, 6 VA.
J. INT'L L. 290-94 (1966).
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perpetuity,"4 appear to negate such intentions by either party at that
time.' In the years following its ratification the Treaty became so
unacceptable to Panamanian nationalists that they were no longer
willing to accept it peacefully. Panamanian discontent has resulted
in two treaty revisions favorable to their interests, one in 1936,6 and
another in 1955.' The decade following the 1955 revision saw nu-
merous clashes between Panamanian civilians and United States
military forces.'
Former President Lyndon B. Johnson announced his decision
in December of 1964 to negotiate a new Canal treaty with Pan-
ama. 9 At the same time, congressional approval to begin to "plan in
earnest" on the establishment of a new sea-level canal was dis-
closed.'° Negotiators from the United States and Panama prepared
three drafts providing for the joint operation of the Canal by 1967.
There was no subsequent ratification of any draft by either country.
Negotiations were renewed in 1971, but proved fruitless." The an-
nouncement by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in February,
1974, of new negotiations with Panama, under a Statement of Prin-
ciples, marked a renewed effort toward transferring the Canal and
Canal Zone to Panama.' 2 Strong congressional opposition was
4. Treaty of 1903, supra note 1, art. II, IV, V.
5. Hoyt, supra note 3, at 290-95.
6. The result of the 1936 revision was that the United States withdrew the guarantee
of independence of article I, raised the annual payments to $430,000 a year, and agreed to
bar all commercial enterprise within the Zone except those directly concerned with shipping.
Treaty with Panama on Friendship and Cooperation, Mar. 2, 1936, 53 Stat. 1807 (1939), T.S.
No. 945. See generally Hunt, The Panama Canal Treaties- Past, Present, Future, 18 U. FLA. L.
REv. 398 (1965).
7. The three significant provisions of the 1955 revision are: 1) the increase in the annu-
ity from $430,000 to $1,930,000; 2) concessions made by the United States relating to the
abandonment of about $24 million worth of real estate and buildings no longer needed by
the Canal Zone administration; 3) United States citizen and non-citizen employees guaran-
teed equality of pay and opportunity, and Panama now entitled to levy income taxes on all
Canal Zone employees except United States citizens, armed forces personnel and depen-
dents. Treaty with Panama on Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, 2
U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297. See generally Fenwick, The Treaty of 1955 Between the
United States and Panama, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 543 (1955).
8. Rioting in 1963 resulted in the death of at least 20 persons and hundreds were
injured. Subsequently, Panama severed diplomatic relations with the United States and filed
charges of "aggression" in the United Nations. Diplomatic relations were restored about six
months later. See Hoyt, supra note 3, at 299-300.
9. 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5 (1965).
10. Id.
11. 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 732, 737 (1971).
12. Joint Statement by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the
United States of America, and His Excellency Juan Antonio Tack, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of the Republic of Panama, in Panama City, February 7, 1974, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL.
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voiced and remained an important consideration in the negotia-
tions. 13
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter, true to his campaign
promises, continued to press the treaty negotiations toward an equi-
table agreement. In August, 1977, United States and Panamanian
negotiators reached an agreement acknowledging that Panama has
sovereignty over its own territory, which voided language in the
Treaty of 1903 relating to United States sovereignty over the Canal
Zone.' 4 On September 7, 1977, in a ceremony at the Washington,
D.C. headquarters of the Organization of American States, Presi-
dent Carter and Brigadier General Omar Torrijos of Panama
signed the new Canal Treaties that would relinquish ownership of
the Canal to Panama by the year 2000.15
II. NEGOTIATING POSITIONS
A. United States
The policy of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico and in
the Caribbean has been characterized by the pursuit of basically
one value-Power.6 This objective has been justified in the name
of "national interests" and "national security."' 7 The exclusion of
other first-rank powers in the Caribbean has been the cornerstone
of the foreign policy pursued by the United States since the enunci-
ation of the Monroe Doctrine'" in 1823.
The fundamental proposition of the Monroe Doctrine, as first
set forth by President James Monroe, is that no European nation
will be allowed to impose its sovereignty or system of government
on any former colony in this hemisphere that had won its indepen-
184 (1974). See also Mazer, Panama Canal Treaty-Statement ofPrincoples Provides Guidelines
for Negotiation of New Panama Canal in Complete Abrogation of Treaty as Amended, 7
VAND. J. TRANS. L. 744 (1974).
13. 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 727, 747 (1976). Midway through 1976, Ronald Reagan, in
his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, made the Panama Canal treaty
negotiations an issue among conservative voters by declaring that President Gerald R. Ford
was trying to give the Panama Canal away. On the Democratic ticket, Jimmy Carter stated
he believed "we've got to retain that actual practical control," but could "yield part of the
sovereignty" over the Canal Zone and renegotiate United States payments to Panama.
NEWSWEEK, May 10, 1976, at 36.
14. NEWSWEEK, August 22, 1977, at 28.
15. 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 481-505 (1977).
16. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 400.
17. Id
18. The "Monroe Doctrine," so-called because of its enunciation in President James
Monroe's message at the commencement of the First Session of the 18th Congress, December
2, 1823; see W. TAFT, THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE 1-39 (1914).
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dence. The Monroe Doctrine was positive in its declaration that the
Western Hemisphere was no longer to be considered subject to fu-
ture colonization by European powers. Existing European colonies
in the Americas were excluded from the Monroe Doctrine, but the
Doctrine was later modified to restrict all nations outside this hemi-
sphere in their efforts to transfer existing sovereignty or to impose
their dominion in an American territory.1 9
The conscious development of a policy based on the Panama
Canal began contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Canal
Treaties, and with the Cuban protectorate in the first years of the
twentieth century.2" Because the Canal was a prime factor in
United States naval defenses, United States policy could not toler-
ate the risk of political disturbance or intervention that might block
the Canal. Considering the possession of Puerto Rico and the ex-
isting protectorates over Cuba and Panama, this self-interested be-
nevolence constituted the "Panama Policy"'" of the United States
from 1898-1934.22 Thus, the motive of the Panama Policy has been
the security of the Panama Canal.
Under the guiding hand of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the
"good neighbor" policy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt led to
increasingly cordial Latin American relations throughout the
1930's.23 The trend in the years thereafter was an acceptance by the
United States of the advancement of Pan-Americanism, andthe
principles later incorporated in the Charter of the Organization of
American States.25
19. For a more in depth discussion, see R. BARTLETT, THE RECORD OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY 168-87 (1956); S. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 384-
96 (4th ed. 1955).
20. The primary concern of United States foreign policy between 1898 and the First
World War was to consolidate the newly established position in the Caribbean and Central
America, to make the necessary diplomatic arrangements for the construction and control of
an inter-oceanic canal, and to assure the protection of the approaches to the canal from both
coasts of the United States. See generally BEMIS, supra note 19, at 503-18; BARTLETT, supra
note 19, at 534-43.
21. BEMIS, supra note 19, at 519-38.
22. The Panama protectorate, the Cuban protectorate, and the two protectorates in His-
paniola, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have since been liquidated. Inter-American rela-
tions and collective security are now under the auspices of the Organization of American
States. See H. DE VRIES & J. RODRIQUEZ-NOVAS, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAS 1-33 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as DE VRIES].
23. BARTLETT, supra note 19, at 551-60; BEMIS, supra note 19, at 764-78.
24. Pan-Americanism may be described as a tendency, more or less pronounced, of the
republics of the New World to associate in a neighborly fashion for mutual understanding of
common aspirations, interests, and their realization. BEMIS, supra note 19, at 756-57.
25. DE VRIES, supra note 22, at 1-33.
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It should be noted that over seventy years ago, strength and
influence were the foundations of world order; the Treaty of 1903
reflected this power concept. The events surrounding the negotia-
tion and ratification of the Treaty antagonized Latin America.
Shortly thereafter, public opinion began to accuse the United States
of seeking conquest in that part of the world that the Monroe Doc-
trine professed to have liberated from European influence.
Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger stressed the
need to avoid a situation in which the Canal could become a rally-
ing ground for all Latin American resentment toward the United
States.26 He summed up the present United States position when he
stated that "[wle recognized that no agreement can endure unless
the parties to it want to maintain it. Participation in partnership is
far preferable to reluctant acquiescence. "27
In the face of Panamanian demands, the United States posi-
tion thus far has been to recognize the unfavorable political climate
in Panama, and to try to achieve an accommodation that will safe-
guard, as much as possible, the most essential interests of the
United States. To this end, the United States agreed to a Statement
of Principles to be followed by the negotiation of a new treaty that
will supercede all previous agreements between the United States
and Panama relating to the Panama Canal.28
B. Panama
Soon after the ratification of the Treaty of 1903, Panama ex-
pressed its displeasure with the one-sidedness of the treaty. 29 Subse-
quently, the United States twice agreed to amend it.30 Although the
United States made minor concessions to Panama after 1955,31 the
call for the scrapping of the Treaty of 1903 by the Panamanian Na-
tional Assembly,3 2 the eruption of anti-American riots in 1964,1
3
and the subsequent break in diplomatic relations, 34 convinced then
26. 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 215 (1976).
27. 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 181 (1974).
28. See note 12 supra.
29. FOREIGN REL. U.S. 586-607 (1905).
30. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
31. In 1960, President Eisenhower issued an executive order requiring the Panamanian
flag to be flown with the United States flag in Shaler Triangle in the Canal Zone. 43 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 558 (1960). See also 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 859 (1959). In 1963, President
Kennedy agreed to have the Panamanian flag flown with the United States flag by civilian
authorities in the Zone. 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1963).
32. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1961, at 9, col. 2.
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President Johnson that a new treaty was necessary.3"
In its attacks upon the Treaty of 1903, Panama has stressed the
fact that the Treaty was negotiated on their behalf by Philippe
Bunau-Varilla, a French engineer who principally sought to serve
his French masters. However, Panama has never maintained that
this fact freed it from the bonds of the Treaty of 1903. Panama's
failure to advance this argument is understandable because Bunau-
Varilla was given the power to negotiate on their behalf, and Pan-
ama ratified the Treaty after it had been negotiated and signed.36
In their continuing efforts to improve the terms of the bargain
that they believe they made, Panama has taken a line that is fre-
quently espoused in the world today. The American presence in the
Canal Zone is, they proclaim, an insult to their sovereign dignity
and an obstacle to their economic development. It is mere colonial-
ism, based on a treaty rather than conquest.37 Several reasons in
support of this position are cited by the Panamanians: 1) the United
States occupies a ten-mile-wide strip across the heartland of Pan-
ama's territory, cutting the nation in two and curbing the natural
growth of its urban areas; 2) the United States rules as sovereign
over this piece of Panama's territory, maintaining a police force,
courts, and jails to enforce United States laws against its citizens, as
well as against Panamanian citizens; 3) the United States govern-
ment operates virtually all commercial enterprises within the Canal
Zone, denying Panama the jurisdictional rights which would enable
its private enterprise to compete; 4) the United States controls virtu-
ally all the deep water port facilities serving Panama; 5) the United
States pays Panama only two million dollars annually for the im-
mensely valuable rights it enjoys on Panamanian territory; 6) the
United States operates a full-fledged government that has no refer-
ence to the host-Government of Panama; and 7) the Treaty of 1903
states that the United States can do all these things forever. 38 Be-
cause of these claims, Panama has received enthusiastic support
from many economically deprived and Latin American nations.39
Claiming that it retained whatever interest it had not expressly
35. 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 887 (1964); 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5 (1965); seeL. JOHNSON,
THE VANTAGE POINT 180-85 (1971).
36. Smit, The Panama Canal" A National or International Waterway, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 965, 974 (1976).
37. See generally Guevara, Negotiating A Peaceful Solution to the Panama Canal
Question, 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 3-14 (1977).
38. 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 455 (1974).
39. See 28 SCOR (1704th mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1704 (1973).
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surrendered,4" Panama has argued that if it had absolutely re-
nounced its dominion over the Canal Zone, the treaty language
would make no sense.4' According to the Panamanian view, it was
clear that, unless the treaty language was meaningless, there was
never any intention to renounce these rights, and the United States
had not meant to acquire them.42 The essence of Panama's position
was "that the United States was merely in the position of a private
lessee; that Panama had not relinquished dominion and sovereignty
over the Canal Zone; that sovereignty was exercisable jointly; and
that any rights not specifically contracted away remained in the full
power of Panama."43
The Panamanian claims, calculated to arouse nationalistic pas-
sion, are political rather than legal. Furthermore, even from a polit-
ical point of view these claims cannot be reconciled with the most
attenuated aspirations of the United States. In fact, the Panama-
nian claims appear to be phrased to disguise Panama's real aim.
Quite understandably, that aim is to obtain complete control of
Panama's principal resource in order to derive the greatest possible
benefit."
III. UNILATERAL TERMINATION BY PANAMA OF THE TREATY OF
1903
A. Legal Justifcations for Nationalization
Unilateral termination of the Treaty of 1903 by "nationaliza-
tion"45 would amount to a clear violation of the basic legal princi-
ple pacta sunt servanda.46 International law, and the sanctity of
contracts, is the natural result of the inevitability of social inter-
course between nations. The binding force of contracts is an obliga-
tion that exists not only in relation to the contracting parties but
40. FOREIGN REL. U.S. 593 (1904).
41. Id. at 591-92.
42. Id. at 598, 601.
43. PADELFORD, supra note 2, at 48-49.
44. 70 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 453-54 (1974).
45. The Institut de Droft International tentatively adopted this definition:
Nationalization is the transfer to the State, by a legislative act and in the public
interest, of property or private rights of a designated character, with a view to their
direction to a new objective by the State.
44 ANN. L'INST. DROIT INT'L (II) 283 (1952).
46. The Latin translation is "observance of agreements." Few rules for the ordering of
society have such a deep moral and religious influence as this principle of the sanctity of
contracts. See Wehburg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775 (1959).
Vol. 8
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also within the international community as a whole.4 7
Despite the fact that many contractual obligations have been
breached during the course of history, the preservation of the prin-
ciple pertaining to the sanctity of international contracts-pacta
sun! servanda-is indeed remarkable. The breach of this principle
has always been regarded as a wrong that entitles the wronged
party to demand compensation.4 s
Governments have always endorsed the principle pacta sunt
servanda.
We advocate faithful observance of international agreements.
Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in
modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefore arises,
by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness
and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the
rights of others and performance by all nations of established
obligations.49
As evidenced by the Panama Canal Treaty controversy, treaty
arrangements aid international order and stability only as long as
they accord with a realistic balance of interests and political
forces.5" The usefulness and relevance of treaties can be retained
when revised as the political balance between the parties changes. 51
A treaty that is to endure for all eternity and to be supported,
without limitation in time, by the armed force of the contracting
Powers, is as great an absurdity as a will that is to regulate for all
time the descent of the property of the living. Nor can the world
be ruled by a system of a perpetual and unbreakable interna-
tional entail.
52
Treaties stand on their own, entirely apart from private con-
tracts. The law of nations has always recognized the fact that such
agreements necessarily are made subject to the general understand-
ing that they shall cease to be obligatory as soon as the conditions
upon which they were executed essentially are altered.5 3 The princi-
47. Id. at 782.
48. Id at 783.
49. From a speech on international affairs and American foreign policy by Secretary of
State Cordell Hull (July 16, 1937) in 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 164
(Washington, 1943).
50. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 747 (4th ed. McNair 1928).
51. See generally Garner, Revision of Treaties and the Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus,
19 IA. L. REV. 312 (1933-34).
52. J. FISCHER-WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL CHANGE
(London, 1932) quoted in Garner, supra note 52, at 312.
53. Taylor, The Panama Canal: The Rule of Treaty Construction Known as Rebus Sic
Stantibus, 1 GEO. L.J. 193, 197 (1913).
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pie that all treaties are concluded upon the tacit condition of rebus
sic stanibus54 has not been denied by any modem authority.5
The common modem practice of limiting the length of treaties
to relatively short periods of time and of providing that each state
may revise stipulations is in deference to the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus.56 The event that terminates a treaty is the disappearance
of the foundation upon which it exists.57 Where no method of pro-
cedure for revision or termination is provided, a demand for revi-
sion or termination is almost certain to be made eventually and
justified upon the rebus sic stantibus doctrine.58 The doctrine, there-
fore, is not applicable when the parties have made explicit that they
wish their arrangement to continue irrespective of any change in
circumstances. It can reasonably be argued that, by providing that
the grant to the United States was made "in perpetuity," the parties
intended the Treaty of 1903 to continue in effect regardless of any
foreseeable or unforeseeable change in circumstances. Acceptance
of this argument would preclude the application of a doctrine that
merely fills gaps.5 9
Though the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is universally ac-
cepted in various forms, its precise meaning and the inferences to
be drawn therefrom are the subject of some disagreement. 60 It is
generally accepted that the principle is applicable only to executory
treaties and to those which have been effective for an indefinite or
relatively long period of time without a provision for optional de-
nunciation by the parties.6' Moreover, general agreement holds that
the change of conditions or circumstances which the doctrine con-
templates must be "vital, fundamental, or essential" and not merely
slight or trifling.62 Disagreement arises, however, as to whether the
54. The Latin translation is "at this point of affairs; in these circumstances." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (4th ed. 1968). The term, as commonly defined, means "vital change
of circumstances." OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 749; J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
335-39 (6th ed. 1963). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62, U.N. Doc.
A/Con. 39/27 (1969); Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895
(1967).
55. OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 747.
56. Garner, supra note 51, at 314.
57. BRIERLY, supra note 54, at 336; see also Taylor, supra note 53, at 197-99.
58. OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 751; Garner, supra note 51, at 314.
59. Smit, supra note 36, at 975.
60. OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 747 n.3.
61. Garner, supra note 51, at 314.
62. The change must not have been foreseen, or capable of being foreseen, by the par-
ties and must not have been due to the action or inaction of the party invoking the rule. See
OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 747.
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continuation of circumstances existing at treaty formation must
have been intended to be a condition under which the parties en-
tered into the treaty.63
One viewpoint suggests that the right of unilateral termination
is a corollary to the rule of rebus sic stanfibus. This view empowers
a signatory to terminate a treaty when, in their opinion, conditions
have changed to their detriment.' The phrase "to their detriment"
is worthy of note. It follows, under this view, that the sanctity of
contracts and contractual obligations depends merely upon whether
the treaty is beneficial to one's own state. Unquestionably, this is a
rejection of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. The rule rebus sic
stantibus, therefore, more often may be recognized and applied
without admitting a party's right to unilaterally terminate a treaty
and free itself of its obligations therefrom.65 As interpreted, the rule
would not undermine the principle of pacta sunt servanda, but
would provide a legal justification for a demand for revision or
termination.
As noted supra, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not
state that one party to a treaty may unilaterally declare the treaty
void when a change of conditions has supervened. Rather, it is a
doctrine that states that a treaty becomes obsolete when an essential
condition upon which it was concluded has disappeared. 66 The
principle underlying the rule of rebus sic stantibus is just and neces-
sary, especially in an age when fundamental changes are constantly
taking place in a state's national and international life.67 Moreover,
such a principle is as necessary for international law and interna-
tional intercourse as the principle of pacta sunt servanda.68
Article V of the Charter of the Organization of American
States, of which both Panama and the United States are members,
states that the international order is based upon the faithful fulfill-
ment of treaty obligations and from other sources of international
law.69 The principles of article V are particularly pertinent to the
Panama Canal. However, these principles, from a legal point of
view, constitute only a program and are not legally binding norms.
They are general expressions of policy for the purpose of erecting
63. Gamer, supra note 51, at 315.
64. BRIERLY, supra note 54, at 337.
65. Gamer, supra note 51, at 318.
66. See notes 50 and 54 supra.
67. Gamer, supra note 51, at 328.
68. OPPENHEIM, supra note 50, at 748.
69. Primed in DE VRIES, supra note 22, at 222.
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legal norms which, in turn, may contain concrete obligations and
provide sanctions for their violation.7"
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, as applied to international
treaties, has been recognized by national tribunals in a number of
European countries.7' In the United States it was so recognized by
the Federal Court of Claims in Hooper v. United States,72 which
held that the United States was justified in abrogating the treaties
concluded with France in 1778, in part, on the ground of an essen-
tial change of conditions following their conclusion. The argument
has also been made regarding a similar abrogation of the Hay-
Paunceforte Treaty of 1901"3 by the Treaty of 1903. 74 Municipal
courts have indicated a disposition to recognize and apply the rule
of rebus sic stantibus, albeit under various names, in the interpreta-
tion of contracts in private law.75
The merits of the rule of rebus sic stantibus, as a principle un-
derlying a system of just and harmonious international relations,
are not affected by any procedural difficulties in its application. The
doctrine may be the only means of escape from what may have
become an intolerable situation resulting from changes of condi-
tions. Commentators have admitted that when, owing to a change
of conditions, treaty obligations become so onerous as to thwart the
development to which a state feels itself entitled, it is certain,
human nature being what it is, that the state will disregard its obli-
gations whether it has legal justification or not.7 6 It may be, there-
fore, that if international law insists too rigidly on the binding force
of treaties, it will merely defeat its own purpose by encouraging
their violation.77 It may be urged that the goal of stability would be
furthered, rather than frustrated, by the development of legal de-
vices for the purpose of terminating those relationships which have
come to be resented as intolerably burdensome and which the com-
70. See Kunz, The Bogota Charter of the Organization ofAmerican States, 42 AM. J.
INT'L L. 568 (1948).
71. Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Egypt. See Garner,
supra note 51, at 321-25.
72. 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887).
73. Treaty with Great Britian to Facilitate the Construction of a Ship Canal, Nov. 18,
1901, 32 Stat. 1903, T.S. No. 401. This treaty was an abrogation of an earlier treaty that
afforded joint protection over any proposed canal route. The treaty also carried over a guar-
antee of the neutrality of any canal constructed. See Hoyt, supra note 3, at 301-02.
74. See Taylor, supra note 53, at 197.
75. In France and England the analogous doctrines of imprivision and frustration are
an established part of the jurisprudence of those countries. See Garner, supra note 51, at 320.
76. Id at 318-20.
77. BRIERLY, supra note 54, at 169.
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munity is no longer interested in enforcing. Stability and change
are not necessarily antagonistic goals. In a changing world, stability
must be envisaged as dynamic rather than static, for it requires con-
tinuous adjustments within the community. Orderly change serves
to maintain the general equilibrium and to prevent catastrophic
and destructive upheavals.78 Circumstances in Panama, as per-
ceived by the Panamanians, may warrant application of the doc-
trine if the new Treaties do not receive the advice and consent of
the United States Senate.79 Indeed, Panama might take some plea-
sure, however brief, in turning the doctrine against the very nation
that, by pioneering reliance on it, greatly enhanced its international
respectability.8 0
IV. PANAMA-SUEZ CANAL COMPARISON
A. The Sovereignty Issue
It is necessary to recognize that acts of nationalization invaria-
bly have been recognized as being within the "sovereignty"'" of the
nationalizing nation-state. When an action of nationalization has
taken place, notably with regard to Iran's oil fields82 and the Suez
Canal,83 it has usually been justified on the basis that an agreement
need be recognized as valid only so long as it contributed to the
welfare of the state, rather than on a strict rebus sic stantibus basis.
This is a state's exclusive right which cannot, under any circum-
78. See Lissityzn, supra note 54, at 897.
79. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra. In making its decision whether to apply
the doctrine, Panama must consider the effect of world opinion. The consequences of violat-
ing a rule of international law calls for the consideration of possible reactions from other
states. Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1135 (1961).
However, such considerations ignore the influence on world public opinion of the strident
nationalism sweeping Third World nations. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 424-25. It would
appear that the United Nations, and its Security Council, have felt the effect of Third World
influence, particularly in regard to the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. See 68 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 490, 497 (1973).
80. See Lissitzyn, supra note 54, at 908-1I.
81. Sovereignty is defined as the supreme, absolute, and uncontrovertible power by
which any independent state is governed; supreme political authority; paramount control of
the constitution and frame of government and its administration; the self-sufficient source of
political power from which all specific political powers are derived; the international inde-
pendence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs
without foreign dictation; also a political society, or state, which is sovereign and independ-
ent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1568 (4th ed. 1968).
82. The Oil Nationalization Act was passed unanimously by both Houses of the
Iranian Parliament in March, 1951.
83. See generally Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal
Question, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 277 (1957).
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stances or conditions, be relinquished or resigned.84
The Egyptian Government asserted that nationalization of the
Suez Canal Company for a public purpose, accompanied by an of-
fer to pay compensation, was a legitimate exercise of the powers of
sovereignty and was a matter which fell within its domestic juris-
diction.85 The governments of the United States, the United King-
dom, and France conceded the general right of a state to
nationalize economic enterprises which have the national character
of the nationalizing state if adequate, prompt, and effective com-
pensation is paid. However, they challenged the arbitrary and uni-
lateral manner in which the Egyptian Government exercised that
right in relation to the Suez Canal Company.
86
The Treaty of 1903 stimulated debate over "the sovereignty
question," a critical issue in the Panama Canal treaty negotiations.
Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal was never challenged.87
The Egyptian Government did not cede away the land over which
the Suez Canal flows.88 By comparison, Panama ceded control of
the land for the Panama Canal to the United States under article
III of the Treaty of 1903, which appears to be a general grant of
sovereignty.89 Panama, taking advantage of the ambiguity, has as-
serted that in the context of the entire treaty the grant of sover-
eignty to the United States is subject to serious limitation.90 The
suppositional language in article III is read by some to mean that
the United States is not the ultimate sovereign. 91 The United States
steadfastly adhered to the view that the net effect of articles II and
III of the Treaty of 1903 was to give the United'States exclusive
84. Hunt, supra note 6, at 419.
85. 11 U.N. SCOR (736th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 736 (1956).
86. 11 U.N. SCOR (735th mtg.) 3-24, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 735 (1956); 11 U.N. SCOR
(738th mtg.) 6-13, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 738 (1956).
87. Huang, supra note 83, at 300.
88. Id
89. The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and
authority within the zone mentioned and described in article II of this agreement
and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in
said article II which the United States would possess and exercise f it were the
sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire
exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights,
power or authority.
Treaty of 1903, supra note 1, art. III (emphasis added).
90. Because most of the provisions of the Treaty of 1903 are related to the singular
purpose of construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the Panama
Canal Zone, it would seem that the Republic of Panama has some basis for its contention
that the grant of sovereignty under article III is limited to that purpose. See generally Note,
Legal Aspects ofthe Panama Canal Zone-In Perspective, 45 BOSTON U.L. REV. 64 (1965).
91. See Guevara, supra note 37, at 6-11.
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control over the Canal Zone as if it were sovereign. 92 Subsequent
recognition of Panama's titular sovereignty over the Canal Zone
appeared to be an insignificant price to pay for the restoration of
Panamanian confidence. Such confidence had been severly eroded
in the wake of the unrest of the late 1950's and early 1960's.
93
Nonetheless, this and other revisions of the Treaty of 190394 have
not altered the basic cause for disagreement which concerns the na-
ture of Panama's grant of sovereignty to the United States and its
geographical extent.
Under the traditional concept of sovereignty, 95 Panama was
hardly an independent nation after concluding the Treaty of 1903.
The United States guarantee of independence 96 was vital to Pan-
ama's existence. Article II of the Treaty of 1903 gave the United
States power to take all adjacent lands deemed necessary for the
construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of
the Canal.97 However, due to ipsofacto acknowledgment of inde-
pendence by the Treaty of 1903, Panama was accepted into the
community of nations with equal and independent status.98 More-
over, because of two minor revisions of the Treaty of 1903,99 the
political fact is that two independent nations each share attributes
of sovereignty in the Panama Canal Zone today.10°
B. Concession Agreements vs. Treaties
Prior to nationalization by Egypt in 1956, the Suez Canal was
92. For a discussion of official positions on this issue taken by the United States, see
PADELFORD, supra note 2, at 48-51.
93. See note 31 supra.
94. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
95. In the nineteenth century there existed three major conditions of world politics: 1)
the nation-state held a position of sole importance; 2) the stability of the world system de-
pended upon the independence of each state; 3) economics was domestically and internation-
ally of no political concern. B. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (1961).
96. Treaty of 1903, supra note 1, art. I.
97. Id., art. II.
98. In this regard, United States influence and the desire of the large nations of Europe
to have the canal constructed should not be discounted. See BEMIS, supra note 19, at 515.
99. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
100. Panama maintains the right to tax its citizens in the Canal Zone while the United
States maintains sole legal jurisdiction within the area. When the new Treaty takes effect,
Panama will take immediate control over 65 percent of the Canal Zone; remaining control
shall pass into Panamanian hands on December 31, 1999. Panamanian courts will assume
civil jurisdiction over the entire Zone immediately, and assume criminal jurisdiction in three
years.
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operated by concessionary grants.' 0 Agreements between the state
and an individual or business association not possessing the nation-
ality or the national character of that state are of recent develop-
ment in international law.10 2 Oil in the Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa, as well as basic minerals and other extractive
products in all parts of the world, are exploited under the conces-
sions system. A concession has been distinguished from a treaty. A
concession is primarily an international economic development
contract or an instrument of coordination whereby a state and for-
eign investor establish a complementary system of economic rela-
tionships for a period defined by the instrument.
10 3
Juridically, the term "concession" might signify: 1) in interna-
tional law, a grant by one state to another of political rights within
its territory; or 2) in municipal law, a grant of exclusive or non-
exclusive rights, privileges, or franchises affecting public interest to
an individual, a public or private corporation, a state or other gov-
ernmental body, or a mixed "public-private" corporation whereby
the state and the private party are joint concessionaires.' 04 The sec-
ond group embraces those grants or concessions extended under the
terms of international treaties and grants by the state, in the free
exercise of its sovereignty or public powers, for the purpose of at-
tracting foreign investment. 105
The Egyptian Government claimed that the "former" Suez
Canal Company was an Egyptian company and was subject to
Egyptian law.'0 6 The governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France disputed Egypt's claim and asserted that the
Suez Canal Company had international status and was subject to
international law.' 0 7 By the agreements of 1854 and 1856, the Suez
101. See Huang, supra note 83, at 300.
102. Carlston, International Role of Concession Agreements, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 618
(1957).
103. Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1958).
104. See generally Carlston, supra note 102, at 634-43.
105. Id An outstanding characteristic of the concession is that the grant is not made
under legal compulsion, but at the absolute discretion of the conceding state. The grant is not
a concession, in the strict sense, if the element of discretion is lacking. The subject matter of
concessions has fallen into two main categories: 1) public utilities and 2) the exploitation of
natural resources. The concession may also be a monopoly on canal building, import and
export trade, or may be for general commerce. The Suez Canal was a monopoly by conces-
sion. See Huang, supra note 83, at 293.
106. See note 85 supra.
107. The following reasons were given: 1) by virtue of the 1888 Convention completing
the system embodied in the concessions; 2) by virtue of the Declaration of 1873 by Turkey;
and 3) by virtue of other surrounding international factors. In addition, France claimed sui
Vol. 8
16
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1978], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss2/9
THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES
Canal Company was granted a concession "to operate" the Canal,
but was not granted ownership of the land over which the Canal
flows."° ' At the end of the concession in 1966, the Egyptian Gov-
ernment was to resume possession of the Canal without paying
compensation for the Canal itself, although compensation would be
paid for materials and supplies of the company.' 0 9 The Concession
Agreement of 1866 specifically provided that the Canal and all its
appurtenances remained under Egyptian territorial jurisdiction. I 10
Under the Treaty of 1903, the United States Government,
rather than private individuals, is the sole owner and operator of
the Panama Canal Company. I"' Because the Panama Canal Com-
pany is at least partially an instrument of the United States Gov-
ernment, the nationalization of the Panama Canal would involve
only public international law rather than both private and public
international law, as in prior cases of nationalization."I2 By defini-
tion, then, the Treaty of 1903 is outside the context of previous na-
tionalizations which invariably involved concessions.
C. Compensation
In order to constitute legal expropriation by nationalization
the taking of private property must be for reasons of public good.' 13
It is also universally recognized in the municipal laws of nations
that there can be no taking of private property without just and
adequate compensation. " 4 However, the realities of the modern in-
dustrial world render full compensation from Panama unlikely." 15
The principle of just compensation gives way to considerations of
the debtor's political instability or its capacity to pay." 6 The Egyp-
generis, that the Company was also amenable to French law and public international law.
For a more in depth examination, see Huang, supra note 83, at 280-89.
108. Id. at 300.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Treaty of 1903, supra note 1, art. VIII, XXII.
112. Prior instances of nationalization involved concession agreements between govern-
ments and private companies that had been for the development of a natural resource. The
claim was made that the nationalization was in the public interest even though the assets of a
private company also were taken. See Kuhn, Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property in its
Impact on International Law, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 709 (1951); Carlston, supra note 103, at
266-67.
113. BRIERLY, supra note 54, at 284.
114. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115. Kuhn, supra note 112, at 710.
116. Id. This was recognized by the United States in the negotiation of the settlement of
claims of United States citizens against the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia by the
335
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tian decree nationalizing the Suez Canal Company provided for the
payment of the price of stock on the Paris Exchange on the day
prior to nationalization. This was followed by alternative offers to
pay the average exchange price over the preceding five years or to
submit the matter to arbitration."
' 7
The Panama Canal's presence and operations have a tremen-
dous influence on Panama's economy."1 ' It is likely that, in the
event of nationalization, Panama could locate sufficient financial
backing to continue the operation of the Canal." 9 Currently, how-
ever, the United States pays Panama $2.3 million a year out of the
operating revenues of $160 million for the right to run the Canal,
while the Panama Canal Company operates at an annual loss of $7
million. 2 o It is important to recognize that the Egyptian expropria-
tions dealt with privately owned enterprises, not enterprises owned
by the United States Government and operated under an interna-
tional treaty. Thus, in the event the Panama Canal is nationalized,
chances of adequate compensation for the expropriated property
and facilities appear remote.
V. COMBATTING UNILATERAL INTERVENTION
A. Background
New nations emerging from the dissolution of colonial empires
exhibit sensitivity to actions which may be interpreted as interfer-
ence in domestic politics or as threatening their newly acquired sta-
tus. 12 1 A necessary corollary to the political independence of a
nation is the duty of others not to intrude or intervene in its internal
affairs. 122 The predominent role, politically and economically, of
the United States in the Western Hemisphere magnifies its actions
in scope and effect. During the period that followed the Latin
American wars of independence until the Spanish-American War,
intervention as well as the fear of possible intervention in Latin
American affairs was attributed primarily to European sources. The
agreement of July 19, 1948. The sum of $17 million was accepted as a lump sum for property
nationalized although the market value was much greater.
117. See supra note 85, at 3.
118. 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 733 (1971). Panama's share of the benefits derived from the
Canal under a new treaty, which is a percentage of a gross revenue royalty based on tonnage,
would be considerably higher than the present annual payment of $2.3 million. See also 70
DEP'T STATE BULL. 184 (1974).
119. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 424.
120. TIME, July 25, 1977, at 28.
121. DE VRIES, supra note 22, at 16.
122. BRIERLY, supra note 54, at 138.
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Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was an attempt by the United States to
spread a protective shield around the newly independent Latin
American states. Subsequently, the new Republics of Cuba and
Panama gave the United States the power to intervene if their inde-
pendence was in danger. The intervention was to be for the purpose
of maintaining order, or protecting life, liberty and property.
2 3
The Latin American preoccupation with unilateral interven-
tion by the United States was offset to a considerable extent by the
"Good Neighbor Policy" of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Ad-
ministration and World War II arrangements for consultation and
collective security. 124 Following the establishment of peace, repre-
sentatives of all American republics joined together to promote
unity in the Western Hemisphere. The result of the conferences was
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly
known as the Rio Treaty.
25
B. The Rio Treaty
The Rio Treaty has a character distinct from all previous In-
ter-American treaties. Where the latter were treaties of a regional
system and independent from the League of Nations, the Rio
Treaty is a regional treaty within the system of the United Na-
tions. 126 References to the Charter of the United Nations are fre-
quent in the Rio Treaty' 27 which is based on the strict legal
obligation of solidarity against aggression; this solidarity is founded
upon the exercise of individual and collective self-defense rights
under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 128 Built entirely on
the concept of "armed attack," the Rio Treaty can only be a system
of self-defense, rather than a system of sanctions. ' 29 The monopoly
over the use of force is in the hands of the Security Council; the
member-states can resort to force only under article 51 and against
an armed attack.
30
123. The Platt Amendment of 1902 was incorporated into the Constitution of Cuba and
into a perpetual treaty (1903) between the United States and Cuba. The Treaty of 1903 with
Panama gave these rights to the United States. See S. BEMIS, THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES-AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 139, 150, 283 (1943).
124. DE VRIES, supra note 22, at 4.
125. 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, reprinted in DE VRIES, supra note 22, at 238-42.
The treaty consists of a preamble and twenty-six articles. See also Kunz, The Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 111 (1948).
126. Id. at 119.
127. Rio Treaty, supra note 125, arts. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 24.
128. See note 126 supra.
129. Id. at 120.
130. Rio Treaty, supra note 125, art. 3, par. 4.
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The Rio Treaty formally condemns war. Under Article I, the
contracting parties agree not to resort to the threat or use of force in
any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
Member-states are obligated to submit every controversy inter se to
those Inter-American procedures in force for peaceful settlement.
This should be done before referring the controversy to the General
Assembly or to the Security Council of the United Nations.13 ' In
addition to the right of self-defense under article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations,'32 American nations have the duty to protect
themselves from attack under the Rio Treaty 33 which imposes a
double duty on the American state not under attack to provide in-
dividual assistance to the state attacked and to be available for con-
sultation.
A special procedure is available in the case of an armed attack
by one American state upon another.'34 In this case not only does
the victim of the aggression have the right to resort to individual
self-defense, but, at the request of the victim, the duty of other indi-
vidual American states arises, and they must assist in collective self-
defense and be available for consultation. Those measures which
each state may take individually, or which may be agreed upon as
collective measures are, pursuant to articles 41 and 42 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, 35 either diplomatic or economic meas-
ures 36 or the use of force.
C The Concept of Self-Defense
The term "collective self-defense" is a misnomer. It is not self-
defense, but defense of another state; it corresponds, in municipal
law, not to self-defense, but to the defense of others. Neither is "col-
lective self-defense" an action in the name and by the authority of
131. Id, art. 2.
132. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not m any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
Reprinted in DE VRIES, supra note 22, at 246.
133. Rio Treaty, supra note 125, art. 3, par. 2.
134. Id., art. 7.
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 41, 42, reprinted in DE VRIES, supra note 22, at 245.
136. Some of those measures are recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions, breaking of
diplomatic relations, breaking of consular relations, complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radio-telephonic or
radiotelegraphic communications. Rio Treaty, supra note 125, art. 8.
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the United Nations. It is not a means to realize collective security. It
is an autonomous exercise of force legalized by the Charter only
under the conditions and within the limits of article 51.1
37
Self-defense may be distinguished from self-help. Self-help is a
procedure for realizing and enforcing the law in a primitive legal
order. Self-defense, as a truly juridical institution, presupposes an
advanced legal order and international self-defense is tied closely
to an advanced international organization. The notion of interna-
tional self-defense depends upon the illegality of war or, as stated
by the Charter, on the illegality of the force used by individual
states. 38 Self-defense is to be further distinguished from the "state
of necessity." Self-defense is full justification; it is a right as well as
an excuse. As in municipal law, self-defense under article 51 is not
a procedure to enforce the law. It is not designed to punish the
aggressor or to obtain indemnities, nor is it an enforcement action
by the United Nations; rather, it serves primarily to repel an illegal
armed attack. Self-defense in municipal and international law pre-
supposes an illegal attack. Consequently, the right of self-defense
under article 51 cannot be exercised against the legal use of force
such as an enforcement action by the United Nations, or the exer-
cise by a state of the right of self-defense.'
39
D. Precedentfor Invoking the Rio Treaty
On February 4, 1964, the Panamanian representative to the
Organization of American States presented a request for a meeting
of consultation as provided by the Rio Treaty. The basis for invok-
ing the Rio Treaty was the alleged unprovoked armed attack
against the territory and civil population of Panama by the armed
forces of the United States stationed in the Canal Zone."4 Has the
precedent of invoking the Rio Treaty for a situation constituting
less than an act of aggression, involving the independence and ter-
ritorial integrity of a state, weakened the treaty as the chief instru-
ment of maintaining law and order in the Western Hemisphere?
Article VI of the Rio Treaty provides that, when the conditions for
the invocation of the Treaty have been met, a group of foreign min-
isters referred to as the Organ of Consultation confer to agree upon
137. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 875 (1947).
138. Id. at 875-76.
139. Id. at 876-77.
140. See generally Fenwick, Legal Aspects of the Panama Case, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 437
(1964).
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the measures to be taken to meet the threat to peace. 14' It was clear
that the conditions of article VI were not met, but political motives
concerned with the revision of the Treaty of 1903 took precedence
over a technical interpretation of the Rio Treaty. It would appear
that if Panama were to peacefully nationalize the Canal, the United
States would be effectively precluded from intervening under the
Rio Treaty.
VI. CONCLUSION
For seventy years the United States has operated the Panama
Canal for the nations of the world more as a public service than as
a business. Nevertheless, over the years the Canal Zone has become
an increasingly troublesome issue. Under the Treaty of 1903, the
United States instituted jurisdiction over the courts, schools, jails,
and police force of the Canal Zone. It established what the
Panamanians regarded as a colonial enclave, splitting their country
in two. The opposition and resentment which increased over the
years predictably led to violence. These developments, culminating
in a dangerous and explosive atmosphere, were clear indications
that the Treaty of l903 had become a constant source of potential
hostility and that, in the mutual interest of both nations, a new
treaty arrangement was necessary.
The Treaty of 1903 specifically gave the United States certain
rights and authority which it would have "if it were the sovereign."
It is clear, these words would not have been necessary if the United
States were in fact intended to be sovereign. The simple fact, there-
fore, is that while the United States exercised virtually complete
jurisdiction over that part of the Panamanian territory which com-
prises the Canal Zone, the United States does not and never had
actual sovereignty. In today's world, all the original assumptions
existing at treaty conception have been reversed. It is submitted,
therefore, that in light of what appears to be a vital change in cir-
cumstances the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus provides a viable le-
gal justification for unilaterally terminating the Treaty of 1903 and
nationalizing the Panama Canal in the event the new Canal treaties
are rejected.
More differences than similarities are apparent when compar-
ing the Panama and Suez Canal situations. There was no question
regarding Egypt's complete sovereignty over the Suez Canal, while
the "sovereignty question" was a continuing controversy between
141. Rio Treaty, supra note 125, art. 6.
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Panama and the United States. Also, the Suez Canal Company
merely held a concession for the operation of a canal, not a grant of
territory through an international treaty. In the case of an expropri-
ation of private property in violation of international law, such as
the breach of its concession agreements by Egypt, there is an obli-
gation to make adequate and prompt compensation. Panama's situ-
ation is quite different from Egypt's, and a demand for
compensation for expropriated property probably would be ig-
nored.
History suggests that when the United States adopts a foreign
policy that evokes substantial resentment in a country, anti-Ameri-
can forces exploit that resentment to their own ends. The Panama
Canal issue involves far more than the relationship between the
United States and Panama. It is an issue which affects United
States-Latin American relations generally; all the Latin American
countries have joined with Panama in urging the adoption of a new
treaty. Indeed, the problem significantly affects the relationship be-
tween the United States and the entire Third World, because the
Third World nations have made this issue a common cause. The
United States position is seen as the last vestige of a colonial past
which evokes bitter memories and deep animosities. 4 2 In the final
analysis, ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty will result in
more gain than loss to United States foreign policy1
43
Jeffery C. Stearns
142. 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 497 (1973).
143. As this comment proceeded into the final stages of publication, the United States
Senate was engaged in a bitter debate concerning ratification of the two Panama Canal Trea-
ties. Opponents of ratification, however, were largely unsuccessful in attempts to revise or
defeat the Treaties.
On March 16, 1978, the Senate gave its approval to the Treaty with Panama, by a vote
of 68-32. L.A. Times, Mar. 17, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
On April 18, 1978, the Senate approved the second of the two Treaties by an identical
vote of 68-32. The second Treaty provides the mechanism by which Panama will gradually
take over control of the Canal during the next 22 years. L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1978, at 1, col.
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